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Watching Insider Trading Law 
Wobble: Obus, Newman, Salman, 
Two Martomas, and a Blaszczak 
 
Donald C. Langevoort* 
 
“The crime of insider trading is a straightforward concept that some 
courts have somehow managed to complicate.”—Judge Jed Rakoff in 
United States v. Pinto-Thomaz1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Commentators repeatedly point out that the law of insider 
trading, though formally derived from Section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, is best understood 
read as a common law-like subject.2  That is because neither the 
statute nor the rule addresses insider trading explicitly, leaving to 
the judiciary to do all the work of fashioning legal doctrine about 
when and why insider trading operates as securities fraud.  The 
SEC has acquiesced in this judicial law-making for the most part, 
preferring taking its chances in the courts (more often than 
 
*  Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law 
Center.  Thanks to Hillary Sale, Bob Thompson, Adam Pritchard, Donna Nagy, 
Andrew Verstein . . for comments on earlier drafts. 
1  352 F. Supp.3d 287, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
2  E.g., Jill Fisch, Constructive Ambiguity and the Judicial Development of Insider 
Trading, 71 SMU L. Rev. 749, 757 n. 62 (2018), citing Thomas Merrill: The 
Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 21 (1985). 




anywhere else in the Southern District of New York) than putting 
the definition of insider trading up for political haggling.  It has 
engaged in very specific rulemaking on a few contested issues, but 
been far from comprehensive; even when the Commission has 
adopted definitional rules (10b5-1 and -2), the courts do not 
always defer.3  Up to now,4 at least, the judiciary has “owned” 
insider trading law, for the most part choosing to give it broad 
reach.   
 Insider trading is a crime, often harshly penalized.  Common 
law crimes are not in fashion, to say the least.  So the accretive 
process by which the law on this topic evolves—for all the 
benefits of incrementalism5—has many critics.6  When insider 
trading law wobbles visibly on some matter, there are enhanced 
concerns about notice, predictability and due process as well as 
the substantive merit of the specific principles being applied.  
 No subject in insider trading law has recently wobbled more 
than the standards for tipper-tippee liability.7  After setting a 
 
3  See p. --- infra.  For a discussion of how the SEC might go further, see John 
C. Coffee, Jr., Mapping the Future of Insider Trading Law: Of Boundaries, Gaps, 
and Strategies, 2013 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 281. 
4   In December 2019, the House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed a 
bill to define unlawful insider trading, perhaps signaling a shift in the locus of 
law-making. H.R. 2534,115th Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 5,, 2019).  Its fate in the 
Senate is unclear. 
5  See Peter J. Henning, Making up Insider Trading Law as You Go, 56 Wash. U. 
J. L. & Pol’y 101 (2018); Fisch, supra. 
6  E.g., Miriam Baer, Insider Trading’s Legality Problem, 127 Yale L.J.F. 129 
(2017); John P. Anderson, Greed, Envy and the Criminalization of Insider 
Trading, 2014 Utah L. Rev. 1 (2014).   The common law crime concern is part, 
of course, of sustained disagreement about whether insider trading law 
makes sense, on which the academic literature is exhaustive.  See generally, 
e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, ED., RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW AND ECONOMICS 
OF INSIDER TRADING (2013); Merritt B. Fox et al., Informed Trading and its 
Regulation, 43 J. Corp. L. 820 (2018). 
7  For a collection and assessment of the many dimensions to tipper-tippee 
liability, see DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT 
AND PREVENTION ch. 4 (2019 rev.ed.) 




fiduciary duty-based framework for insider trading liability under 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in Chiarella v. United States8 in 1980, 
the Supreme Court ruled in Dirks v. SEC9 three years later that 
tipper-tippee liability requires proof that the tipper be breaching 
a fiduciary-like duty in passing on the information to the tippee 
for the tipper’s own personal benefit, and that the tippee knows or 
should know of that breach.  A host of bothersome issues thus 
arose, some addressed in dicta in the Court’s opinion but mostly 
left for future litigation—most notably, what does personal 
benefit mean, and how, exactly, is it applied in motions to dismiss 
or expressed in jury instructions?  Many dozens of cases since 
then have confronted this question.  Judge Rakoff has decided 
more than a few and, more candidly than most, expressed 
frustration via occasional lamentations to his readers (or the law-
gods) about what is going on.  His frustrations will be our guide to 
what follows, from a judge whose involvement in insider trading 
enforcement goes way back to the Chiarella prosecution.10  
 For two decades after Dirks, the law steadily evolved in a 
way that made the personal benefit requirement either easy for 
enforcers to satisfy or completely inapplicable.11  When it applied, 
 
8  445 U.S. 222 (1980).  In an opinion by Justice Lewis Powell, Chiarella 
reversed the conviction of the defendant, who worked at a financial printing 
firm, because he owed no fiduciary-like duty to others trading the same 
shares in the securities marketplace. 
9 463 U.S. 646 (1983).  Dirks reversed an administrative sanction imposed 
against a high-profile investment adviser who received material nonpublic 
information from whistleblowers about a fraud-riddled company whose 
shares he had recommended to clients, and caused them to sell their shares 
before the fraud was revealed. 
10 See Rakoff’s Roots Run Deep in Insider Trading Law, May 29, 2015, 
https://www.law360.com/articles/660987/rakoff-s-roots-run-deep-in-
insider-trading-law.   
11   Donna Nagy’s important work has traced this devolution in what 
enforcers had to show under Dirks.  See Donna M. Nagy, Beyond Dirks: 
Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading, 42 J. Corp. L. 1 (2016); Donna M. 
Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 Iowa 




two kinds became standard: quid pro quos with some pecuniary 
pay-offs (e.g., kickbacks to the tipper), and “gifts” of information 
to family members and friends. That increasingly relaxed 
approach emboldened both criminal prosecutors and the SEC. In a 
2012 civil case, SEC v. Obus,12 the Second Circuit offered a 
sweeping restatement of all the elements of tipper-tippee liability, 
some never previously so characterized.  (Rakoff famously called 
the decision “Delphic” in his first opportunity to apply its 
teachings,13 not in a good way). Among other things, the Obus 
framework allowed tippees to be held liable without knowledge of 
the tipper’s alleged benefit. 
 Soon thereafter, in United States v Newman,14 a panel of the 
Second Circuit addressed personal benefit more strictly, 
seemingly—but without directly saying so—rewriting Obus at 
least in the criminal context as to the standards for both tipper 
and tippee complicity. It sought to connect gift-giving and real 
benefit by demanding proof of a sufficiently close relationship 
between tipper and tippee “that is objective, consequential and 
represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly 
valuable nature” and insisting that the tippee have actual 
knowledge of the breach and benefit.15 Newman was a rare god-
send to the defense side, destabilizing the doctrine on which many 
prior and on-going cases were founded.  But then, on review of a 
Ninth Circuit decision that rejected the most demanding aspects 
of the Newman approach as to the meaning of gift in family 
settings (United States v. Salman,16 written by the peripatetic 
 
L. Rev. 1315 (2009).  See also Donald C. Langevoort, The Demise of Dirks: 
Shifting Standards for Tipper-Tippee Liability, Insights, June 1994, at 23. 
12 693 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2012).  See Donald C. Langevoort, “Fine Distinctions” 
in the Contemporary Law of Insider Trading, 2013 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 429, 
449-58 (2013). 
13  United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp.2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).   
14  773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014). 
15  Id. at 452. 
16  792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015). 




visiting Judge Rakoff), the Supreme Court agreed that Newman 
went too far in its retrenchment.17 Precisely how much too far 
was unclear, however, so the wobbling was far from over.  
Then came the two Martomas.  The main legal question 
presented on appeal in a highly publicized prosecution, though 
not necessarily crucial to the ultimate outcome of the case,18 was 
whether the gift benefit prong under Dirks and Salman requires a 
close pre-existing relationship of family or friendship.  Or is there 
a personal gift benefit in any intentional conveyance given with 
the purpose or expectation that the tippee will trade?  In Martoma 
I,19 a divided Second Circuit panel said that the expectation is 
enough, regardless of to whom, and abrogated Newman to the 
extent that it indicated otherwise by its reference to a 
meaningfully close relationship.  There was a petition for 
rehearing en banc claiming that (among other things) the panel 
had no authority to overturn that holding in Newman absent 
direct Supreme Court direction.  Nearly a year later, in June 2018, 
the panel substituted a completely new opinion (Martoma II) 
reinterpreting Newman rather than abrogating it, but once again 
making the tipper’s specific purpose to confer a benefit on the 
tippee sufficient and potentially dispositive.20  Part of Newman’s 
 
17  Salman v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 420 (2016). 
18  In Martoma, there was separate evidence of a pecuniary motivation for the 
tips.  Dr. Gilman, the main tipper, was being paid considerable consulting fees 
for his meetings with Martoma to discuss the clinical drug trials in which 
Gilman was involved.  The disagreement between the majority and Judge 
Pooler was as to the correctness of the charge to the jury on the theory of gift 
benefit (which they both agreed was flawed) and whether it was harmless 
error in light of the pecuniary benefit. 
19  869 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2017). 
20  894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2018)(appropriate to infer “that the corporate insider 
receives a personal benefit . . . from deliberately disclosing valuable, 
confidential information without a corporate purpose and with the 
expectation that the tippee will trade on it.”  Id. at 79.  The small differences 
between the two Martomas is clear enough. See Marshall v. United States, 
368 F. Supp.2d 674 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). I will simply use “Martoma” for this case 
except as necessary to distinguish from the withdrawn opinion, Martoma I. 




own precious gift to Wall Street and the defense side was thus 
taken back.21   
 None of this is breaking news.  Newman and Salman have 
been the subjects of extensive academic and professional 
commentary for the last few years, and the Martoma cases have 
now joined the on-going contestation.22  Nearly everyone who 
writes much about insider trading (and a few interlopers as 
well23) has had something to say about the wobble, with wildly 
mixed opinions.24  As to the panel’s authority to abrogate 
Newman, for example, a case comment in the Harvard Law Review 
treats Martoma II as a “stealth overruling” of Newman, but then 
concedes that Newman was a stealth overruling of Obus (and so 
on), so that what Martoma II did should not cause great angst.25  
The merits of the debate should matter more. 
 My essay is initially about the kind of gratuitous tipping 
addressed in Martoma, which might not seem to be practically 
important but instead more of a legal brain teaser.26  In this 
 
21  Courts in the Second Circuit have noted the effect of Martoma on Newman.  
E.g., Gupta v. United States, 913 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2019); United States v. Pinto 
Thomaz,, supra, 352 F. Supp.3d at 301 (“What remains of Newman therefore 
applies in only the rarest of cases”). 
22  E.g.,, John C. Coffee, Jr., Tippers and Tippees: The Impact of Martoma II, 
Columbia Blue Sky Blog, July 23, 2018, 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/07/23/tippees-and-tippers---the-
impact-of-martoma-ii/; A.C. Pritchard, Insider Trading Law and the 
Ambiguous Quest for Edge, 116 Mich. L. Rev. 945 (2018); Jonathan Macey, 
Martoma and Newman: Valid Corporate Purpose and the Personal Benefit 
Test,  71 SMU L. Rev. 869 (2018)(criticizing Martoma I); Michael Guttentag, 
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading,, 69 Fla. L. Rev. 519, 542-43 (2017). 
23  See Richard A. Epstein, Returning to Common Law Principles of Insider 
Trading After United States v. Newman, 125 Yale L.J. 1482 (2016). 
24 See Symposium: Salman v. United States, 69 Stan. L. Rev. Online (2016), 
https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/type/symposium-salman/.   
25  U.S. v. Martoma—Second Circuit Redefines Personal Benefit Requirement for 
Insider Trading, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 1730 (2019). 
26 The closest precedent I know of involves a tip to the insider’s barber. See 
SEC v. Maxwell, 341 F. Supp.2d 941 (S.D. Ohio 2004). 




academic spirit, Martoma I posed a hypothetical about a well-
heeled apartment dweller giving a holiday gift to his doorman in 
the form of a stock tip in place of the usual cash. But this hypo 
isn’t particularly well-crafted insofar as valuable tips to doormen 
can be seen as an effort to buy superior service for the 
forthcoming year, which would be a form of pecuniary gain, not a 
pure gift. So Martoma II strips this down a gift of a stock tip to 
someone simply with the statement that he (the tippee) can make 
money by trading on the information. Joan Heminway’s thoughtful 
article on the subject uses a more compelling “Robin Hood” hypo 
about tips meant to take from the rich and give to the poor.27  All 
these are fun to a degree, but the fact that some version of the 
question presented itself in both Newman and Martoma, each a 
big-time hedge fund-related prosecution, shows how closely it lies 
to the subject of what constitutes a legitimate trading edge for 
securities professionals, and where the line is they cannot safely 
cross.  Big money turns on the answer.  As we shall see, the 
decision in Martoma arguably gives enforcers a tool against 
selective disclosure to market professionals they might not have 
realized was in the toolkit.  
Contrary to many, I think Martoma’s holding is well-
grounded.  Explaining why will take us into the weeds of insider 
trading theory and doctrine, the overgrowth of which is widely 
acknowledged.  This is incurable without statutory codification,28 
but even then would still fall short of the clarity many say they 
want.  The robust persistence of insider trading enforcement 
(criminal and civil) is based as much on politics as coherent 
policy.29  But unlike others who have critiqued the politics of 
 
27 Joan McLeod Heminway, Tipper/Tippee Insider Trading as Unlawful 
Deceptive Conduct: Insider Gifts of Material Nonpublic Information to 
Strangers, 56 Wash. U. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 65, 68-69 (2018). 
28  See pp. --- infra. 
29  Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady Roberts: The Ideology and Practice 
of Insider Trading Regulation, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1319, 1320-21 (1999).  To be 




insider trading, I think that the expressive political dimension to 
the law has considerable legitimacy if kept in bounds. Insider 
trading enforcement has become a recognizable brand symbol for 
American-style securities regulation, touching on some deep-
seated public fascination, envy and distaste for the arrogance of 
economic elites and others who exploit some undeserved edge in 
the stock markets. It is not about creating a level playing field, 
which as Judge Rakoff has pointedly said is unrealistic,30 but 
rather when to take away the edge that comes from wrongfully 
being high on the privileged side.  The campaign against abusive 
trading generates public support for the complex mission of 
investor protection more generally, which is consequential 
whether or not we have a coherent theory of how and why it 
constitutes securities fraud.31 
But wait, there is more.  At the very end of 2019, the Second 
Circuit sent the insider trading ball bouncing in an unexpected 
direction yet again, holding that to the extent that a tipper-tippee 
case is brought as either mail/wire fraud or under a (until now) 
rarely utilized public company securities fraud statute, personal 
benefit has no place at all.  At first glance, the case—United States 
 
clear, I think there are sound policy reasons to restrict insider trading but 
they are more wonkish than the rhetoric surrounding insider trading 
enforcement seems to assume. 
30  See p. --- infra. 
31  Some critics of the fairness approach to insider trading regulation agree 
with the political description of the motivation but denounce its normative 
justification, seeing the SEC’s efforts as pure rent-seeking either on the part 
of the Commission itself or certain interest groups who benefit from 
aggressive insider trading enforcement.  E.g., Jonathan Macey & David 
Haddock, Regulation on Demand: The Influence of Special Interest Groups on 
SEC Enforcement of Insider Trading Rules, 30 J. L. & Econ. 311 (1987); more 
recently, see Jonathan Macey, The Central Role of Political Myth in Corporate 
Law, Aug. 19, 2019, available at 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3435676.  This essay is not an 
effort to resolve that debate but instead argues for the coherence of insider 
trading law as we know it as derived from an effort to promote fairness in 
markets, though not via egalitarianism.  See pp. --- infra. 




v. Blaszczak32—provides a well-lit pathway for criminal 
prosecutors, but not the SEC (or private plaintiffs), to pursue 
tippees simply on their awareness that the inside information 
should be considered stolen goods.   It is much too early to say 
what this new line of inquiry will bring, or even if the holding will 
survive much after its birth.  On close inspection, however, it 
connects some dots that, in hindsight, have long been in plain 
sight.  
So we will first address the road from Dirks to Martoma, 
which will then put us on a course that eventually gets us to 
Blaszczak and the pinball-like motion of insider trading law circa 
2020, Chiarella’s fortieth anniversary.  Unnecessary complication?  
We shall see.33   
   
II. READING DIRKS LITERALLY: BENEFIT TO THE TIPPER 
 
 The precise question debated in Martoma is about what to 
do if an insider tips someone with whom he has no close personal 
relationship and without any expectation of compensation in 
return.  Both Martomas purport to draw their doctrinal 
 
32  --- F.3d --- (2d Cir. 2019). On the statutory potential of the criminal 
securities fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. sec. 1348, see Wendy Gerwick Couture, 
Criminal Securities Fraud and the Lower Materiality Standard, 41 Sec. Reg. L.J. 
77 (2013); Karen Woody, The New Insider Trading, Ariz. St. L.J. (forthcoming, 
2020). 
33  Michael Perino reminds us in an important article that for all the 
occasional doctrinal drama, most insider trading cases do not push on the 
boundaries of doctrine, in which case the wobbles are of importance only to a 
narrow band of enforcement.  Michael A. Perino, Real Insider Trading, Feb. 
2019, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3338536. He 
provides good evidence that aggressive cases are the exception, and that 
enforcers back off when they sense the law is moving away from being 
aggressive. 




conclusions from a close reading of Supreme Court precedent, 
mainly Dirks.  (Salman—a blessedly unanimous opinion by the 
Court given the egregious facts—says little more than Dirks was 
clear enough about its meaning and didn’t need or warrant 
Newman’s gloss.)   But as shown by the ensuing debate in the two 
Martomas between the majority and Judge Pooler, who dissented 
twice, Dirks offers its reader plenty to stumble over.  Seeing why 
requires some background. 
  
 A.  History, Text and Structure 
 
 I and many others have recounted in some detail how the 
law of insider trading under Rule 10b-5 came to be.34  Historically, 
it is very much the product of a particular and now long gone 
historical period during which courts construed federal statutes 
and rules purposively, construing grants of law-making authority 
“flexibly, not restrictively.”35  (The Second Circuit was initially 
ambivalent as to this activism but soon became a convert in a long 
series of securities cases over the course of the 1960s and early 
70s,36 occasionally restrained by the moderating impulses of the 
remarkably influential Judge Henry Friendly.37)  The seminal 
 
34 See Joel Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities Law Concerning 
Non-Public Information, 73 Geo. L.J. 1083 (1985); LANGEVOORT, INSIDER 
TRADING, supra, ch. 2. On back further in time, an interesting history is 
presented in Michael Perino, The Lost History of Insider Trading, 2019 U. Ill. L. 
Rev. 951. 
35  See A.C. Pritchard, Launching the Insider Trading Revolution: SEC v. Capital 
Gains Research Bureau, in Bainbridge, ed., RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra, at 33, 
about the case from which those often-quoted (though less so lately) words 
came. 
36  See A.C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Law in the Sixties: The 
Supreme Court, the Second Circuit and the Triumph of Purpose Over Text, 94 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 371 (2018). 
37  Historical research shows how much Friendly, in turn, was influenced by 
Professor Louis Loss of Harvard, with whom he had frequent correspondence 




Texas Gulf Sulphur case was an exemplary product of this kind of 
thinking.  Even though open-market insider trading is hard to see 
as deceptive (the insider trader communicates nothing false or 
misleading simply by submitting an anonymous bona fide order to 
buy or sell), the word “fraud” was taken to be sufficiently elastic 
so as to encompass constructive fraud—an equitable principle 
that would allow abusive behavior (including fiduciary breaches) 
to be treated as if deceptive to avoid unjust enrichment,38 even if 
the common law elements of deceit are absent.  Duties reached as 
far as need be to inspire investor faith in market integrity.39  Or so 
it was thought. 
 That generous approach to securities law was trashed by 
the Burger Court starting in the mid-1970s.  The surprise, 
perhaps, is that insider trading regulation under 10b-5 somehow 
survived this retrenchment at all.  In Chiarella, the Supreme Court 
scolded the Second Circuit for its failure to restrain the 
overbreadth of “abstain or disclose,” but then plastered together 
the doctrinal edifice under the revisionist banner of fiduciary 
responsibility.40 The fraud fiction thus continued.  As a result, 
fiduciaries vis-a-vis the issuer had a duty to abstain or disclose 
material nonpublic information to marketplace traders; others 
not.  That naturally raised concerns about tippers and tippees, 
 
on securities issues, including cases he was working on. See Margaret V. 
Sachs, Judge Friendly and the Law of Securities Regulation: The Creation of a 
Judicial Reputation, 50 SMU L. Rev. 777 (1997). Loss, in turn, was by the late 
1960s working on a massive project to codify the federal securities laws and 
thus an interest in having the Second Circuit case law be as much in harmony 
with his proposals as possible.   
38 Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-
Chiarella Restatement, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 6-7 (1982); LANGEVOORT, INSIDER 
TRADING, supra, sec. 2:2 at 2-5; see also James Park, Rule 10b-5 and the Rise of 
the Unjust Enrichment Principle, 60 Duke L.J. 345 (2010). 
39  See Donald C. Langevoort, From Texas Gulf Sulphur to Chiarella: A Tale of 
Two Duties, 71 SMU L. Rev. 835 (2018).  The Second Circuit opinion in 
Chiarella was actually a fairly nuanced holding, contrary to what Justice 
Powell makes it seem in the Supreme Court’s opinion.  Id. at 845-46. 
40  Id. at 845-48. 




because the latter were outsiders, not fiduciaries. Even though 
there was no tipping at issue in Chiarella, Justice Powell dropped a 
footnote to assuage this fear saying that tippees may inherit the 
tipper’s fiduciary duty by becoming “participants after the fact” in 
the tipper’s fiduciary breach, i.e., co-venturers with the insider.41   
 So when Dirks came to the Court three years later, Justice 
Powell quickly sought control of the case and insisted that it 
should simply follow his Chiarella footnote. Raymond Dirks had 
received material nonpublic information about a massive fraud at 
a well-known issuer from some whistleblowers and helped them 
publicly expose the fraud, though not before causing his clients to 
dump the stock before its collapse.  Still feeling some sting from 
Chiarella, the SEC (unwisely) applied an expansive approach to 
tipper-tippee liability in its proceeding against Dirks that 
essentially made the fiduciary duty of the source run to all who 
 
41  This footnote itself has an interesting history.  The co-venturer concept, 
which stresses that tippee culpability is entirely derivative of the tipper’s 
fiduciary duty, was recognized in a Second Circuit decision construing insider 
liability under state corporation law (the law of Florida).  Schein v. Chasen, 
478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973).  But that decision was vacated by the United 
States Supreme Court on grounds that the issue of first impression was for 
the Florida Supreme Court to decide.  Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 586 
(1974).  The Second Circuit decision is interesting because it draws a clear 
distinction between the right approach to liability under state corporation 
law and under Rule 10b-5, the latter being more expansive. Presumably 
because the Second Circuit decision was formally vacated (and perhaps 
because it had distinguished this approach from how 10b-5 should be 
interpreted), it was not cited directly in the Chiarella footnote—just a 
reference to an American Bar Association Committee letter, which had drawn 
from Schein v. Chasen.  What the court in Schein was describing was a form of 
civil conspiracy (or more precisely, a conspiracy to breach a fiduciary duty) 
arising from the formation of a “common enterprise” to exploit a fiduciary 
obligation. 478 F.2d at 822.  To this end, the court also drew from the 
Restatement of Agency 2d. sec. 312 (1958), which provides for third party 
liability for intentionally causing or assisting a fiduciary breach.   




came in possession of the secret with knowledge of its 
confidential origins, and a divided D.C. Circuit agreed.42   
Powell was not impressed.  We know that not simply 
because of the Dirks opinion itself, but because of some 
remarkable documents that Adam Pritchard found some time ago 
in Powell’s archived materials—opinion drafts, marginal notes, 
and inter-chamber correspondence.  From these, as Pritchard 
shows, we can piece together how the Dirks test came to be.43  In 
the earliest drafts, Powell had two clear objectives: to tether the 
test for tipper-tippee liability to his Chiarella footnote, and to 
assure that the test would not unduly chill the bona fide 
interactions between insiders and market analysts that he saw as 
necessary to market efficiency.44  These first drafts of the opinion 
were straight-forward, simply requiring a court to find that the 
tipper’s purpose in passing on the information involved disloyalty 
to the issuer and its shareholders, which would not be the case if 
the insider was merely careless in divulging some bit of material 
information to an analyst, thinking it immaterial or already public.  
To this, Powell and his clerk added contrasting illustrations of bad 
motivations: quid pro quo tips for the pecuniary benefit of the 
tipper, and “gift” tips specifically intended by the tipper to benefit 
 
42  Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
43  A.C. Pritchard, Dirks and the Genesis of Personal Benefit, 68 SMU L. Rev. 
857 (2015). The entire Dirks file is now available on-line via the Lewis Powell 
Collection at the Washington & Lee Law School library website (hereinafter 
as “File at –“). I have previously drawn from these documents in a number of 
writings; E.g., Langevoort, Fine Distinctions, supra, at 453; Michael Guttentag 
has engaged in a close reading of Dirks in light of them as well, identifying 
four underlying purposes in what Dirks says—none of which, he argues, 
bears its weight today.  Guttentag, supra, at 526-35. 
44  His clerk assigned to the case, Jim Browning (now a federal judge), was 
much more aggressive at the outset, trying to get the Justice to at least 
consider either no tippee liability at all, or even no 10b-5 insider trading 
liability at all, Chiarella notwithstanding.  File at 8-11.  Browning, in turn, 
drew heavily in his memos and drafts from the scholarship of Michael Dooley 
and Frank Easterbrook.  Browning graduated from the University of Virginia 
School of Law, where Dooley taught. 




the tippee.  The latter are the words, unchanged throughout all 
the later drafts, on which Martoma ultimately turns.  
 This test was apparently pleasing to Powell—in essence, he 
was simply saying that the breach of duty on which tipper liability 
is premised is the duty of loyalty as opposed to the duty of care.  
There was nothing about making the test particularly demanding 
beyond this, even with respect to securities analysts.45  He quickly 
got three other votes to overturn the SEC. Somewhat resistant 
was Justice O’Connor, who sent Powell a memo saying that she 
objected to his focus on the tipper’s purpose, which she thought 
much too subjective.46 She wanted him to substitute a 
requirement that the SEC or prosecutors prove up an actual 
benefit to the tipper—an objective test.   
 From his notes, Powell seems reluctant; as a former 
corporate lawyer, it was natural for him to think of fiduciary duty 
in terms of an attitude of loyalty and good faith.47  And fiduciary 
duty law has never required an actual benefit to the fiduciary or 
harm to the beneficiary; quite the opposite.  O’Connor, the former 
trial judge in Arizona, was coming from another place entirely, 
concerned about evidence. Compromise ensued,48 which 
produced a semantic mess.  To preserve his initial approach, 
Powell kept most of his language about purpose, along with all his 
illustrations.  But he also inserted the requested language about 
proof of actual benefit, without much effort to reconcile the two, 
which if anything suggests (as Pritchard argues) that both 
 
45  Pritchard, supra, at 861-63. 
46  Id. at 865-66.   
47 At first glance, Powell may be read to welcome O’Connor’s suggestion (he 
writes back about her “quite constructive” memo) but his notes on her memo 
twice say “no” to what she is pushing.  Id. at 866.  More importantly, his edits 
to the opinion by no means jettison his preferred purpose-based standard. 
Quite the contrary is true. 
48  The draft with the O’Connor revisions can be found in File at 371.  A 
heavily marked up page shows how much Powell was trying to keep as much 
of his approach as possible.  File at 385-86. 




motivation and benefit-in-fact may be required, even though 
neither justice was advocating that dualism49  It was in doing this, 
relatively late in the drafting process, that Powell also added 
reference to the possibility of a reputational benefit, presumably 
to take in the more speculative possibility of gains to the tipper 
that may (or may not) be anticipated later on even if nothing is 
delivered at the moment.50   
 My point here is not to suggest that these early drafts and 
private letters are authoritative as to Dirks’ precedential meaning, 
any more than the private explanations of a legislative drafter 
determine the meaning of a statute.51 But cases like Obus and 
Martoma explicitly struggle with the overlapping references to 
objective and subjective benefit, so the back story at least helps 
explain the confusion.52   
 
 B.  Martoma and the Mighty Comma 
 
 
49  Pritchard, supra, at 870. 
50  I suspect that Powell feared that the insistence on objective evidence of 
pecuniary gain might be taken too far, and thus made clear by reference to 
reputation that an inference of  possible future benefit would suffice. Powell 
also struggled (and never really resolved) with the overlapping relationship 
between his duty-based approach to tipper liability and the separate 10b-5 
requirement of scienter.  This becomes even more vexing when he turns to 
tippee state of mind, discussed infra.   
51  Pritchard agrees.  Id. at 874-75, citing Adrian Vermeule, Judicial History, 
108 Yale L.J. 1311 (1999).    
52 The best practical reconciliation I can think of is that the government must 
show that there was some disloyalty vis-à-vis the issuer or source by offering 
objective direct or circumstantial evidence of potential gain from which to 
infer subjective intent to benefit.  The real question is whether this evidence 
indicates, at the time of the tip, the tipper could reasonably expect to benefit.  
This is important, because as courts have repeatedly pointed out, the very 
nature of reputational and sometimes even pecuniary benefits is that their 
value usually comes much later, and maybe never.   




 Back to the question: under Dirks, is the intent to make a gift 
of the information disloyal per se, or is that category limited to 
meaningfully close relationships with family and friends, for 
which it may be said—as is repeatedly emphasized by the 
Supreme Court in Salman—that tipping someone close to you is 
like the tipper trading on his own and then giving the proceeds to 
the loved one?   I will come back to this simile in a bit.  
Chief Judge Katzman’s majority opinion in Martoma is a 
hyper-close reading of Dirks’ text (almost as if it were a statute 
being interpreted by a strict originalist) in support of a stand-
alone “intent to benefit the tippee” route to tipper-tippee liability.  
In so doing, Martoma seizes on language in Dirks that had been in 
plain sight but largely ignored in tipping jurisprudence up until 
then.53  The analytical progression in the key paragraph in Dirks 
says, as discussed above, that while purpose may be the ultimate 
question, objective proof as to benefit is required.54  It then refers 
to pecuniary and reputational benefit as two ways to do this 
(oddly using “i.e.” rather than “e.g.”) After a citation on that point 
to some secondary authority, it gives examples for when the 
inference of such benefit is proper, which had been in multiple 
earlier drafts: “there may be a relationship between the insider 
and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or 
an intention to benefit the particular recipient.”55  Martoma seizes 
on the comma in the middle of this sentence to claim that the 
Court is offering two distinct routes to proving a tip, the latter 
being a simple intention to benefit the tippee without the need for 
any pre-existing relationship.56  Only in the next sentence—with 
 
53  Not surprisingly, Martoma claims that this language is familiar, put to use 
in SEC v. Warde, 151 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1998) and even Newman.  894 F.3d 
at 74, 77.  But in neither does the court put much if any weight on it as a 
distinct route to liability. 
54  463 U.S. at 664. 
55  Id. (emphasis added). 
56  This reading makes the reference to relationships at the beginning of the 
sentence applicable only to what comes before the comma.   




the word “also” to suggest that this is additional, not defining or 
limiting—is there any specific reference to friends or family or (in 
the sentence that follows that one) the foggy point about such tips 
being the equivalent of trading followed by a gift of the proceeds.   
 What the panel majority is doing here is clinging 
desperately to Justice Powell’s original focus on the tipper’s 
purpose—the particular words that are important to Katzman are 
ones that appeared in draft opinions in Dirks early on, well before 
O’Connor.  From the archives we see that the distinct idea of an 
intentional tip to give someone a marketplace advantage as a clear 
breach of loyalty stated in the first draft and Powell’s 
accompanying notes without any reference to family or friends.57  
With all the subsequent changes that go on elsewhere in the 
drafting, that distinctive language about the purposeful tip 
remained.  In dissent, Judge Pooler does just the opposite: seizing 
on the handful of O’Connor inspired snippets that reject purpose 
in favor actual benefit, objectively demonstrated.  She is insistent 
that gift benefit arguments be accompanied by a convincing (if 
often circumstantial) story about the potential for some kind of 
gain, such as the inference that giving a tip to a close family 
member or friend will naturally enrich all those in the 
relationship.  She wants nothing to do with purpose as such. 
The Dirks Court’s failure to reconcile the two inconsistent 
ideas explains much about Martoma’s difficulty. It comes down to 
whether one can fairly read the insistence on benefit-in-fact as 
entirely evidentiary in assessing the presence of disloyalty, or 
something more dispositive.  How much did Powell give away to 
O’Connor, in other words?   Different sentences or fragments 
suggest different answers to this question, which is not surprising 
given that Powell was trying to satisfy O’Connor without silencing 
 
57  See pp. – supra. 




his own strong views about the motivational nature of fiduciary 
duty and good faith.58 
Textualism aside, is it cogent and sufficiently compelling to 
proscribe deliberate gift tips outside the circle of family and 
friends as breaches of loyalty?  Commenting on Obus and 
Newman, Pritchard says no;59 in contrast, Donna Nagy and Joan 
Heminway both say yes in part by reference to more recent 
Delaware fiduciary duty case law,60 which puts in the category of 
disloyalty and bad faith actions deliberately taken without regard 
for the interests of the corporation.  Even without such resort, I 
think that there is benefit whenever fiduciaries takes something 
valuable as their own to do with as they please without serving 
their master (the issuer or source), regardless of what they 
ultimately choose to do.  The exercise of dominion is itself a form of 
(unjust) enrichment.61  Judge Rakoff seems to agree, saying in 
Pinto-Thomaz that the “use of the term ‘personal purpose’ or 
‘personal advantage’ [in Dirks] could have averted subsequent 
 
58  I see little in Salman to resolve any of this confusion.  Salman quotes Dirks 
extensively, including both Powell and O’Conner inspired sentences as if 
there is no tension.  Curiously, the Court puts the distinct “intent to benefit 
the tippee” language in italics, without explanation.   Judge Pooler in 
Martoma I (see 869 F.3d at 86-87) and others note that the government in 
Salman made broad arguments about the meaning of tip and the role of 
personal benefit, which the Court sets forth.  The opinion then immediately 
says that the case can be resolved on narrow grounds—the nature of gifts in 
a family setting.  She suggests that this is an implicit repudiation of the 
government’s argument.  I don’t see it as such, but rather the common 
approach of not seeking to resolve doctrinal issues beyond what is necessary 
to answer the question posed by the grant of certiorari.  The Court gives no 
reasons why it would reject the government’s position.   
59  Pritchard, supra, at 869-74. 
60  Nagy, supra, at 42; Heminway, supra, at 90-91. 
61  Jill Fisch seems to be making a similar point about the tipper’s increase in 
utility.  See Jill Fisch, Family Ties: Salman and the Scope of Insider Trading, 69 
Stan. L. Rev. Online 46, 51 (2016). 




confusion;”62 the stand-alone inference, in other words, coheres 
well enough with the Dirks Court’s intent.   
 Martoma also makes a structural argument.  It dismisses the 
idea that a deeply meaningful relationship between tipper and 
tippee is necessary by reference to the two other (less 
controversial) kinds of personal benefit, pecuniary and 
reputational.  If the former can be satisfied by as little as a couple 
of lobsters, theater tickets or jars of honey from the tippee, or the 
hope of a bright future, it is not doing all that much work.63  So, 
according to the panel, it hardly makes sense to be so elastic there 
yet arbitrarily strict for pure gifts.  But this proves too much.   I am 
fairly sure that Judge Parker in Newman would have liked, if he 
could, to attach his requirement of “objective and consequential” 
pecuniary-like expectation to all three prongs, not just gifts.  To 
him, I suspect, a jar of honey for a big tip shouldn’t suffice to 
create a co-venture either.  And I’m not sure that the Supreme 
Court would disagree if faced with those facts (as opposed to the 
egregious family sharing plan in Salman).  
 Reputational benefit deserves more thought than it has 
been given—this remains the most undertheorized form of 
personal benefit.  Powell adds it to the Dirks opinion relatively late 
as part of the O’Connor edits, perhaps to make clear (as against 
what O’Conner was pushing) that personal benefit does not have 
to involve an immediate or certain payoff to the tipper; it is 
enough to reasonably hope that something good may come as a 
thank you kind of payback later on. We are back to purpose, in 
other words.  No prior relationship is necessary here: consider a 
hypothetical where a young investment banker brazenly seeks out 
a big-name hedge fund manager whom he has never met and 
simply delivers a valuable tip with the words “you’re welcome.”  
 
62  352 F. Supp.3d at 299. 
63  See United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2018). 




Given how the favor bank works on Wall Street,64 this might be 
characterized as seeking a reputational benefit, and given the 
cronyism involved, certainly should be.65  On the other hand, 
hoping for something of significant value in return may seem 
delusional, failing Judge Pooler’s reasonable expectations 
approach.  So while a sensibly broad approach to reputational 
benefit would obviate the need to address my hypo as a form of 
gift-giving, I think the stand-alone intent to benefit standard is 
better aligned with what animates the inclusion of reputation in 
the personal benefit analysis.  Gratuitous tips may be good 
conversation starters, with the relationship coming later. 
 There is one more textual clue in Dirks that bolsters the 
Martoma conclusion, though the panel didn’t stress it.  Toward the 
very end of the Supreme Court’s opinion, in concluding that there 
was no breach for personal benefit by the whistleblowing 
insiders—which resolves the case—it says “nor did they make a 
gift of valuable information to Dirks.”66  If a meaningfully close 
personal relationship was essential to gift-giving, the Court 
presumably would have noted that, because there was no such 
relationship.  This language, which seems to admit of the 
possibility of a gift benefit in a tip to an investment professional 
with whom they had no prior relationship, much less a close 
personal one, thus fits better with Martoma’s reading. 
 This, however, brings us to the two “friends and family” 
sentences in Dirks, and the thought that tipping friends and family 
members “resembles” the insider trading and then giving the 
 
64  Tom Wolfe’s memorable image from The Bonfires of the Vanities (1987), 
about doing favors on Wall Street without asking for anything in return, just 
with the hope/expectation that something good will come of it down the line.  
See Coffee, supra. 
65  See Donald C. Langevoort, Informational Cronyism, 69 Stan. L. Rev. Online 
37, 39 (2016).  For a corruption-based theory of insider trading, see Sung Hui 
Kim, Insider Trading as Private Corruption, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 928 (2014). 
66  646 U.S. at 665-66. 




proceeds to them.67  The analogy is only superficially helpful, 
because the same thing could be said about many tips; indeed, in 
early drafts of the opinion this form of “indirect benefit” was 
invoked to justify the entire idea behind the personal benefit test, 
not just the gift prong.  If the idea is that the gains to the tippee 
will somehow come back to enrich the tipper because of the close 
relationship, that seems both speculative and poorly defined.  
Think of the many cases that could not easily be categorized—a 
tip to the portfolio manager of the endowment fund of her alma 
mater.  There are just too many forms the relationship between 
tipper and tippee can take for the analogy to bear much weight in 
disposing of cases.   
 That said, I have to concede that the two sentences have 
come to be part of the canon of tipper-tippee law, and not so 
easily by-passed. Salman jumped right to them to conclude that 
the gift-giving language in Dirks needs no further elaboration 
making them the rationale for rejecting Newman’s tightening.  And 
as Jack Coffee points out, if we take the facts in Martoma (ignoring 
the pecuniary quid pro quo), it is very hard to see what Dr. Gilman 
did as “resembling” trading massively for his own account and 
gifting the proceeds to a hedge fund by way of Mathew Martoma.68  
The friends and family qualifier to gift benefit has been around, 
used and quoted long enough for it to have taken on a life of its 
own, pre-dating Newman and its gloss.  So while I have come to be 
 
67  In the evolution of the Dirks opinion, the idea and language about friends 
and family, including the simile, is taken almost verbatim from an opinion 
piece in the Legal Times by Leonard Chazen that appeared roughly at the 
time the case was being argued.  Chazen, Dirks Presents Unique Corporate, 
Social Issues, Legal Times of Washington, March 14, 1983, at 14, 18.  For a 
while, the draft opinion gave Chazen credit for the concept with an extensive 
quotation, but Powell later directed his clerk to remove the citation on 
grounds that reliance on such media commentary might not be appropriate.  
File at 225.  Much the same idea was also expressed in the ABA letter cited in 
the Chiarella footnote (see note – supra), with reference to friends, family “or 
others;” this cite was eliminated in editing as well.  File at 216. 
68  Coffee, supra. 




persuaded that Martoma’s reading probably makes better sense of 
the law of fiduciary responsibility on which insider trading theory 
is grounded, the more conventional reading of gift benefit—
bolstered by Salman’s fascination with the simile—may be the 
more likely one, at least outside the Second Circuit or until the 
next stealth overruling. 
 
III. TWO THEORIES, CONFLICTING PRINCIPLES 
 
“Essentially, insider trading is a variation of the species of fraud 
known as embezzlement, which is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary 
as ‘[t]he fraudulent taking of personal property with which one has 
been entrusted, especially as a fiduciary.’  If the embezzler, instead of 
trading on the information himself passes on the information to 
someone who knows it is misappropriated” information but still 
intends to use it in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, 
that ‘tippee’ is likewise liable, just as any knowing receiver of stolen 
goods would be”—Judge Rakoff in Pinto-Thomaz69 
 
 Judge Rakoff has for some time now expressed the wish that 
insider trading law be thoroughly grounded in misappropriation, 
from which a simpler “stolen goods” approach to tipper-tippee 
liability would naturally follow.  He has expressed no affection for 
the classical “abstain or disclose” theory,  from which the Dirks 
test was derived.  Yet today, Dirks controls under both theories. 
Perhaps that is one of the unnecessary complications some courts 
have fostered.  Again, we have to go back in time. 
 
 
69  352 F. Supp. 3d at 295-96.  Previously, see SEC v. Payton, 97 F. Supp.3d 
558, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)(Rakoff, J.: insider trading “is a form of cheating, of 
using purloined or embezzled information to gain an unfair trading 
advantage”). 




 A.  More Doctrinal History 
 
 The federal securities law of insider trading through (and 
including) the retrenchment in Chiarella and Dirks was entirely 
about the duties to abstain or disclose that traders with an 
informational advantage owe to others trading 
contemporaneously in the securities markets.  The Supreme Court 
held that such a duty exists when the defendant is a fiduciary who 
trades or tips, because others trading in the marketplace can be 
seen as the beneficiaries of that trust.  This is the classical theory, 
for which Dirks sets the rule for tipper-tippee liability.   
When Chiarella was being briefed and argued before the 
Supreme Court, the Solicitor General’s office abandoned the more 
expansive conceptions of duty that flourished in the aftermath of 
the Second Circuit’s Texas Gulf Sulphur decision and tried to get 
the Court to buy into a narrower framework, which it presumably 
thought had a better chance before an increasingly conservative 
lineup of justices.70  The SG’s approach made the law turn on 
misappropriation, which was presented in two distinct versions in 
the government’s brief. One retained the focus on protecting 
contemporaneous marketplace traders by imposing a duty to 
abstain or disclose to the market anytime the information has 
been misappropriated, whether by breach of fiduciary duty or 
 
70  See Brief for the United States, 1979 WL 213521.  Until shortly before 
briefing and argument, Frank Easterbrook was the Deputy Solicitor General 
to whom those who eventually handled the case for the SG’s office (Stephen 
Shapiro and Kenneth Geller, who subsequently became leaders of the 
Supreme Court bar) reported.  Before leaving, Easterbrook took the lead in 
urging a property-based approach to insider trading.  See SEC Historical 
Soceity oral history, Jan. 2011, http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-
5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/oral-
histories/20110113_Easterbrook_Frank_T.pdf.  The connection between the 
property-rights misappropriation approach to insider trading and 
Easterbrook’s influential writings on the subject later on is palpable.  See 
Langevoort, Tale of Two Duties, supra, at 846-47. 




mere theft.  The other was to find deception in the breach of 
entrustment itself, where the trader is pretending to be a faithful 
fiduciary to the source of the information, but in fact acting 
disloyally.  In Chiarella, the majority accepted neither argument 
on the merits, finding them insufficiently charged below, 
therefore leaving both for future consideration if and when 
properly pled and charged. For the time being, at least, fiduciary 
duty was it.  In dissent, Chief Justice Burger said he would apply 
the market-facing disclosure approach to misappropriation to 
sustain Chiarella’s conviction.  In a concurring opinion, Justice 
Stevens agreed with the majority but said encouraging things 
about the fraud on the source argument for future cases. 
The Supreme Court eventually embraced the 
misappropriation theory a decade and a half later in United States 
v. O’Hagan.71  But which version?  The Second Circuit’s early cases 
supporting misappropriation were somewhat ambiguous on this, 
not seeming to put much weight on (or even noticing) much in the 
way of substantive distinction.72  Since then, however, it has 
become clear that it was not Burger’s conception73 but rather the 
argument that Justice Stevens liked.  By feigning fidelity, the 
misappropriator deceives the source of the information, taking 
advantage of misplaced trust.  To experts in white collar crime, 
this version of misappropriation bears a close family resemblance 
to the “honest services” idea that for so long drove many high-
 
71  521 U.S. 642 (1997).     
72 In the first Second Circuit decisions applying the misappropriation theory, 
the “Burger” and “Stevens” approaches to the theory were intermingled.  E.g., 
United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1032-33 (2d Cir. 1986)—which, 
by the way, Jed Rakoff argued on the defense side.  It appears that Justice 
Powell considered the misappropriation theory an invalid application of 
Section 10(b), but left the Court shortly before he would have been able to 
reject it in Carpenter.  A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O’Hagan, Agency Law 
and Justice Powell’s Legacy for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 13 
(1998).   
73  Contrary to Judge Rakoff’s attribution, see Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F. Supp.3d at 
297. 




profile mail and wire fraud prosecutions, which might explain its 
quick take-up among prosecutors and judges at the time.74  The 
biggest practical difference between the two theories has to do 
with the “mere theft” of information.  The Burger approach 
readily includes all purloined information within the duty to 
disclose, no matter how obtained, while the fraud on the source 
theory only kicks in when the theft takes a deceptive form (like 
embezzlement).75  As the quotes from Judge Rakoff show, it is 
tempting today to treat misappropriation as the theory of insider 
trading, expressing the first principles from which insider trading 
doctrine should follow.  After all, most all classical cases are also 
misappropriation case (though not vice versa).  Indeed, Rakoff 
seems anxious to throw the classical theory into deep storage76 
It is also tempting to speak of misappropriation in property-
like terms,77 although this steps into intellectual quicksand.  The 
resemblance to embezzlement has been noted in the case law for 
decades (pointedly made in the government’s brief in Chiarella), 
 
74 About the same time as Chiarella was decided, not yet Judge Rakoff wrote 
an extensive survey of the history and use of the mail and wire fraud 
statutes: Jed Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 Duq. L. Rev. 
771 (1980); on the subsequent evolution of mail fraud as applied to insider 
trading, see William K.S. Wang, Application of Federal Mail and Wire Fraud 
Statutes to Criminal Liability for Stock Market Insider Trading and Tipping, 70 
U. Miami L. Rev. 220 (2015).  
75  This is what made a hacking SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009), 
involving insider trading via hacking.   
76  Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F. Supp.3d at 297 n.3 (“While the ‘classical theory’ may 
still be occasionally employed even today, it is hard to imagine an insider 
trading case that does not fit comfortably within the confines of the 
misappropriation theory”).  For an argument for a misappropriation-based 
unified theory of insider trading, see Zachary Gubler, A Unified Theory of 
Insider Trading Law, 105 Geo. L.J. 1235 (2017).   
77 Judge Ralph Winter played a considerable judicial role in translating an 
academic theory to doctrine.  See his concurring and dissenting opinion on 
the application of the misappropriation theory in United States v. Chestman, 
947 F.2d 551, 567 (2d Cir. 1991(en banc).  He sought to draw a line between 
business-related misappropriation and more informal settings in a case 
involving a family-controlled business..   




but of course embezzlement takes money or property away from 
its rightful owner; insider trading is merely the unauthorized use 
of the information, often without any measurable harm to its 
owner.78  To be sure, there might be a threat to the value of the 
information in a given case—and so good reasons to proscribe the 
misconduct.  But ultimately the misappropriation theory is more 
about the abuse of trust in the sharing of secrets, applicable to 
settings where the “owner” of the information has invested in the 
gathering valuable information that has been entrusted to agents 
of the firm, but extending well beyond.  It is more contract than 
property, and even then, can be as much in the hands of the courts 
as a matter of law (fiduciary duty) than expressed intent of the 
parties. Still, the embezzlement and stolen goods rhetoric 
persists.79  It appeals especially to conservative-leaning academics 
and judges because it appears to privatize the interests at stake, 
reducing judicial discretion to the identification of pre-existing 
protectable economic interests rather than searching for more 
public-regarding duties.   
 The case law on tipper-tippee liability under the 
misappropriation theory took a solid turn the “stolen goods” 
 
78  Rational insider traders take pains to conceal their trading from all but a 
close circle, if that, because leakage erodes the trading advantage. 
79 There is also a conceptual difference.  The Burger-endorsed 
misappropriation theory was grounded in investor protection and avoiding 
marketplace abuse by embezzlers and thieves.  By contrast, the theory 
underlying fraud on the source in its pure form is the protection of the 
owner’s property interest in exclusive use of the secrets from embezzlement 
and deceptive thievery.  The first makes insider trading a matter of public 
law; the second smacks of private law. I suspect that many judges who apply 
the misappropriation theory as we know it today instinctively think of it as 
grounded in investor protection, in the spirit of Chief Justice Burger. Justice 
Ginsburg tries hard in O’Hagan to make this connection, though formally 
adhering to the victimization of the source alone.  See Donna Nagy, Reframing 
the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability: A Post-O’Hagan 
Suggestion, 59 Ohio St. L.J. 1223 (1998). Rakoff can be read as doing so as 
well.  But there are profoundly different implications to following the 
property rights view, including about the treatment of tippers and tippees.   




direction in the 1990s.  Both the SEC and criminal prosecutors 
took the litigation position that personal benefit was required 
only in classical cases, which found some (though not uniform) 
support.80 This distinction came to matter more and more as 
misappropriation grew in reach. The pivotal case was United 
States v. Libera,81 involving “tippers” who worked at the plant 
where Business Week magazine was printed and distributed, and 
who—for very little, if any, compensation—delivered advance 
copies to recipients who used the advantage to buy and sell stocks 
mentioned favorably in the investment column.  The Second 
Circuit affirmed 10b-5 liability in a striking opinion written by 
Ralph Winter, rejecting defendants’ main argument that the 
workers did not actually even know what the recipients intended 
to do with the information (i.e., it wasn’t obviously a tip to 
facilitate trading because the recipients could have had many 
reasons for wanting an advance look).  Judge Winter anticipates 
Rakoff with repeated references to embezzlement and stolen 
information, and firmly embraces a property rights approach.82  
Misuse of someone else’s information was enough, apparently, 
and as far as what was in it for the workers, the panel said simply 
that “it may be presumed that the tippee’s interest in the 
information is, in the contemporary jargon, not for nothing.”  Dirks 
is cited, but reference to personal benefit was conspicuously 
absent.  A few years later, in United States v. Falcone,83 the court 
 
80  See SEC v. Musella, 748 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); SEC v. Willis, 777  F. 
Supp. 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).  The First Circuit a few years later read Second 
Circuit law as not requiring benefit.  SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 
2000). 
81 989 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1993). 
82  Id. at 600.  The court does insist on a fiduciary breach by the insider and 
that the tippee know or have reason to know of the breach.  In that sense, 
Dirks has an influence, but personal benefit is not part of it.   
83 257 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2001).  Falcone (written by now Justice Sotomayor) 
seems clear to me that there are separate and distinct tests for tipper-tippee 
liability for classical and misappropriation cases, with personal benefit 
relegated to the former.  Id. at 231-32. 




reaffirmed Libera in concluding that nothing in the Supreme 
Court’s intervening O’Hagan decision in any way undercut its 
reasoning.  The exclusion of personal benefit from the analysis 
was even more palpable in Falcone.84  Misappropriation law was 
heading in its own direction, hastening Dirks’ demise.  Trial judges 
were confused.85   
 Yet that turn in the maze led to a dead end.  Obus, Newman 
and Martoma now all say without hesitation that the Dirks test for 
tipper-tippee liability applies equally to classical and 
misappropriation insider trading cases, as if the stolen goods line 
of cases never happened.  Obus (which Newman and Martoma 
simply follow on this point) cites Falcone alone for this 
proposition,86 even though Falcone reads as just the opposite.  In 
this sense, Obus put a sudden stop to one wobble in the tipper-
tippee case law, but set another in motion as district judges faced 
up to the challenges of applying the personal benefit test in the 
wave of hedge fund trader prosecutions that were cresting at the 
time, including the prosecutions leading to Newman and Martoma. 
 
84 In contrast to Libera, Falcone and other cases distancing misappropriation 
cases from Dirks, an Eleventh Circuit case squarely adopting a unified 
standard noted that Dirks could be rendered moot simply by avoiding the 
lesser-included classical theory in a charge, and it seemed too consequential 
a holding to allow that to happen.  SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003). 
85 For an expression of angst about this direction the Second Circuit law was 
taking at that time, see SEC v. Smath, 277 F. Supp.2d 186 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).   
86 693 F.3d at 286. Neither Falcone nor Libera says explicitly that they are 
rejecting personal benefit.  But both (especially Falcone) subdivide the 
discussion of tippee liability with personal benefit playing a significant role in 
the classical context, while there is no mention of it in the separate 
articulation of tipper-tippee liability for misappropriation..  An SEC 
administrative law judge took the implausible view that the latter omission is 
only because it was not something that needed to be mentioned by the court 
of appeals.  In the Matter of Boylan & Ruggieri, 112 SEC Docket 2469 (2015).  
On review by the Commission, dismissal of the SEC’s case by the ALJ was 
affirmed by an equally divided Commission, which at the time consisted of 
only two Commissioners.  Commissioner Stein disagreed and would have 
overturned the ruling; Commissioner Piowar voted to affirm, but on grounds 
that no tip was satisfactorily proven, not on personal benefit grounds.     





 B.  Dirks as a Workhorse 
 
“Anyone who thinks that the stock market is a level playing field 
obviously has no contact with reality.”—Judge Rakoff, cautioning 
prosecutors from the bench in Pinto-Thomaz87 
 
Rakoff is right, of course.  But insider trading law has never 
really promised a level playing field.  There was a brief period of 
time after Texas Gulf Sulphur when it might have been so read, but 
that passed surprisingly quickly.  By the mid-1970s, even the SEC 
had rejected strict egalitarianism as bad law and bad policy; the 
courts in the Second Circuit distanced themselves from it 
unrealistic implications as well.  As I have written elsewhere 
recently in tracing this history, by the time of Chiarella, the 
equality principle had mainly become a bogeyman for Wall Street 
to use in pushing back against insider trading law’s reach, though 
I concede (from personal recollection) that some enforcers at the 
time and even to this day still yearn for a restoration.88 
Since that time, insider trading law has been read mainly for 
the work it does.   Most courts and commentators treat the 
Supreme Court’s decision as straight-forward and (assuming they 
take it seriously) functional in design—about sorting the 
circumstances in which outsiders gain an informational advantage 
into the good and the bad.  As courts up through Obus made light 
of personal benefit, critics saw this as a perversion of the Court’s 
original intent that could undermine the work it is supposed to be 
 
87 Lexicology: The Insider Trading Mess that Congress is Trying to Fix, Paul 
Hastings LLP, May 16,, 2019, available at 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=266c1283-c920-4b56-
a508-667e53e518c9. 
88  See Langevoort, Two Duties, supra at 840-43, 846. 




doing, although for most of that time neither the SEC nor 
prosecutors were targeting market professionals in a way that 
pushed hard on these efficiency concerns. With the hedge fund 
cases, that changed; Newman and its enthusiasts were 
resurrecting Dirks not only in form but in function.  Two recent 
empirical studies of stock trading by market professionals 
determine that the Newman decision was followed by a noticeable 
step-up in aggressiveness by savvy traders in the form of larger 
orders and larger trading duration in the face of informational 
asymmetry.89 
 The stock story is that Dirks is all about market efficiency 
and (to some at least) protecting property rights in private 
information.  As to the former, legitimate information search 
should not be chilled by the threat of liability; the elements of 
tipper-tippee liability should thus work to protect analysts and 
professional traders.  As we have seen, this idea gets prominence 
in both Chiarella and (especially) Dirks, so there is no doubt it was 
important to Justice Powell and his colleagues in the majority of 
those two cases.  But it is also important not to overstate this.  The 
Court had ample opportunity to restrain or reject insider trading 
law and tipper-tippee liability much more radically in the name of 
efficiency, but didn’t.  Fiduciary obligation seemed to matter a lot 
to Powell,90 even though the Court had said just a couple of years 
 
89  See Manesh Patel, Does Insider Trading Law Change Behavior? An 
Empirical Analysis, 53 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 447 (2019); Marcin Kacperczyk & 
Emiliano Pagnotta, Becker Meets Kyle: Inside Insider Trading, Aug. 2019, 
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3142006.  
The latter authors also show that in the few years before Newman, with the 
arrival of Preet Bharara as U.S. Attorney for the Southern District, there were 
more cautious trading patterns.  Id. at 5. 
90  I have imagined in earlier work a conversation between Powell and 
William Cary, the SEC Chair who inspired the Commission to go after insider 
trading as a form of (constructive) fraud.  Cary’s opinion in the Cady Roberts 
case was repeatedly cited in both Chiarella and Dirks, in a very supportive 
tone that suggests that Powell was a believer in what Cary was trying to 




earlier that fiduciary duties were for state corporation law to 
enforce, not 10b-5.91  As noted earlier, his explicit concern with 
market efficiency was real but mainly about avoiding liability for 
carelessness as opposed to disloyalty in the course of insider-
analyst meetings.  Stronger readings of Dirks about promoting 
efficiency may project more onto the Court’s intent than 
necessary.92   
   This is why the portion of Newman at issue in Salman 
gathered so little concern from commentators.  Salman involved a 
market professional, but as intra-family tipper, not tippee.  
Newman’s point—in the selective disclosure context—was to 
warn prosecutors away from making “friend” claims too liberally 
to evade the personal benefit filter, which the Court in Salman 
easily cabined by focusing on the stench of intra-family cronyism.  
Even Richard Epstein writes that Salman was an easy case for the 
government under his neoconservative assessment of tipper-
tippee law.    
By contrast, Martoma is much more threatening insofar as it 
rejects the family and friends collar entirely when there is 
sufficient (objective) evidence that the purpose of the tip was to 
enrich the recipient.  I have already suggested a reading of 
Powell’s opinion that permits precisely that, even as it takes us 
into more contestable territory about selective disclosure.  Before 
we go there, however, we should take stock of the high-level 
public policy at issue as it has been used to critique the wobble 
from Obus to Martoma.   
 
accomplish, so long as read through the lens of fiduciary obligation.  See 
Langevoort, Fine Distinctions, supra, at 460-61. 
91  Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
92 As to Justice O’Connor, her suggestion to objectify the inquiry was 
seemingly to make the trial judge’s job easier Pritchard, supra, at 866 (“I am 
not sure about what will be gained from an inquiry into intent, but from my 
past experience on the bench, I know that a great deal of time will be lost!”) 




 Deciding doctrinal issues by reference to first principles is 
hard without a clear theory of what those principles should be. A 
fairness-based, level playing field principle is sometimes put forth 
in favor of aggressive regulation (which almost automatically 
signals disdain for Dirks and Newman), but notoriously difficult to 
substantiate via hard evidence.  More sophisticated versions focus 
on market liquidity and cost of capital. For example, Merritt Fox, 
Larry Glosten and Gabe Rauterberg argue that insider trading 
doctrine should be premised on achieving an optimal balance 
between encouraging bona fide fundamental market research and 
minimizing the adverse selection problems (liquidity costs) that 
come when uninformed traders fear that they can be exploited by 
informed traders.93  This leads them to conclude that, contrary to 
Obus et al., there should be a stark difference between classical 
and misappropriation cases as to personal benefit. In terms of 
Dirks’ expressed imperative of not chilling analyst information 
search, which is presumably a virtue of a personal benefit 
standard, that applies well to interactions between analysts and 
insiders (classical theory) but not to information held secretly by 
persons other than the issuer (misappropriation).94  Analysts 
mainly focus on the former, and not the latter.  Besides suggesting 
this wrong turn on the road to Martoma, they argue that 
deliberate issuer-authorized tips to analysts should be banned 
whichever theory applies—the adverse selection problem 
dominates the need to encourage research once the problem of 
inadvertent leakage is addressed. 
 The “alt” theory in insider trading, as noted, it is to protect 
the property rights belonging to the owner of the information 
 
93 See Fox et al., supra. 
94  See also Merritt B. Fox & George Tepe, Personal Benefit Has No Place in 
Misappropriation Tipping Cases, 71 SMU L. Rev. 767 (2018)(arguing that the 
law is not so clear that further change could not take place to restore the 
view that the Dirks test be confined to classical cases).  In many ways they 
anticipate the Blaszczak case, discussed infra. 




from embezzlement or its equivalents.  Judge Winter’s opinions in 
Chestman and Libera took this on as their mission, as we saw.95  A 
fundamental implication of the property rights idea is that the 
owner gets to do with the information as it wishes, free of 
government meddling at least so far as the securities laws are 
concerned.  A large body of scholarship (mostly conservative) 
agrees, with Frank Easterbrook as an early and influential 
proponent.  While an early version of this said that there was no 
need for federal regulation at all—owners can protect themselves 
using common law agency, fiduciary, tort, contract and property 
principles—that idea has faded in favor of seeing insider trading 
law as a useful federal law tool for sanctioning informational 
embezzlers. But recall that Winter wanted no place for personal 
benefit.   In his commentary on Newman and Martoma I, by 
contrast, Jon Macey argues that a personal benefit requirement is 
crucial to cement into place a strict property-rights/private-
ordering approach. He thus treats the Dirks test (including 
personal benefit strictly applied) as a necessary protection for 
dissemination of information that serves the owner’s private self-
interest.96  
 
95  See pp. --- supra. 
96 See Macey, supra; see also Jonathan Macey, The Genius of the Personal 
Benefit Test, 69 Stan. L. Rev. Online 64 (2016).  Macey reads Martoma I as 
endorsing a definition of unlawful tipping that applies anytime information is 
imparted with an expectation that the tippee will trade.  He notes, rightly, 
that that would indeed set Dirks on its head if read literally—under the facts 
in Dirks, it could fairly be said that the whistleblowers should have 
“expected” Dirks to tip his clients to sell while helping expose the fraud, yet 
the Court held that there was no insider trading liability for anyone involved.  
To be sure, if the tipper-tippee test were reformulated to say that there is a 
tip anytime information is imparted by an insider with such an expectation, 
the test would be overbroad.  By reference to text extracted verbatim from 
Dirks about “intention to benefit,” however, Martoma I is plainly using the 
word expect to mean a motivation to facilitate or enable as a form of selfish 
use.  In any event, Martoma II discarded this emphasis on expectation in 
favor of intent. 




 If we are reasoning from first principles, it is unclear why 
personal benefit is a better test than what Macey really seems to 
want to get at—business purpose—as suggested in Martoma II.  
The standard reading of Dirks from the beginning is that a tip 
genuinely motivated by a belief that the tip is in the issuer’s best 
interest does not violate Rule 10b-5.  A handful of courts in the 
Second Circuit have suggested that business purpose or not is 
indeed a sound way to apply Dirks: if no plausible business 
purpose can be gleaned from the facts, the presumption is of 
personal benefit.97  Indeed, this follows from the reading of Dirks 
given earlier: objective evidence from which to infer subjective 
(selfish) purpose.  
  However this particular issue is resolved, I worry that it 
concedes too much authority to the “owner” of the information.  
This is inevitable under the fraud-on-the-source approach to 
misappropriation, where it is clear that the owner can license 
others to trade on the information for any reasons it wishes, 
regardless of any adverse effects on the marketplace.  The law is 
far less clear under the classical theory, which makes me less 
inclined to put it in storage the way Judge Rakoff seems willing.   
 Suppose an independent, disinterested board of directors 
authorizes the CEO and CFO (and others, perhaps) to trade with 
abandon on any inside information they possess.  (A more 
realistic example might be to allow senior executives to trade 
without restriction for 48 hours after the latest 10-K or 10-Q.)  
Would that provide a complete defense to an insider trading 
charge brought by the SEC, assuming that the defendant 
possessed material non-public information at the time of the 
trade?   Property-rights advocates would argue, with some force, 
 
97  See LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING, supra, sec. 4:7 at 4-20, 4-21, citing, e.g., 
SEC v. Rubin, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) par. 97,784 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); see also SEC 
v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1995).  The government made this argument to 
the Supreme Court in Salman, but the Court affirmed on narrower grounds. 




that the issuer owns the information, so that assuming proper 
corporate governance principles are satisfied, those in authority 
can waive the fiduciary obligations that would otherwise attach, 
just as under the misappropriation theory.  But if we see the 
classical theory as a federally created duty owed to marketplace 
traders, it is far from clear that such absolution would work 
simply by operation of the principles of corporate governance, 
especially given the anti-waiver provisions of the ’34 Act.98   
Precedent favors treating trading by the issuer itself (stock 
buybacks in particular) as unlawful under Rule 10b-5 if the issuer 
is in possession of undisclosed material facts.99  But if the issuer 
cannot trade based on inside information, why is Dirks commonly 
read to say that selective disclosure (tipping to an analyst or 
active shareholder) is permissible so long as intended to carry out 
company policy, which is Newman’s high ground?100  I have 
already given reasons why Dirks can (and should, I think) be read 
to preclude issuer-authorized selective disclosure as an 
intentional gift, though I realize the conventional reading of Dirks 
 
98  Both Chiarella and Dirks triggered some debate about “issuer-authorized” 
insider trading For an extensive discussion with citations as the pros and 
cons of insider trading as a default rule, see Gubler, supra, at 1263-67.  For an 
argument in favor, see John P. Anderson, Where’s the Harm in Issuer 
Authorized Insider Trading?, 69 U. Miami L. Rev. 795 (2015).  At least under 
Delaware corporate law, securities law liability is outside the scope of the 
internal affairs doctrine, see Sciabacbucchi v. Salzburg (Del. Ch. 2018), and 
the duty of loyalty is non-waivable in the face of claims of unfairness.  
99  See Langevoort, INSIDER TRADING, supra, sec. 3:6 at 3-9, 3-10 (discussing 
cases).  See also Mark Loewenstein & William K.S. Wang, The Corporation as 
Insider Trader, 30 Del. J. Corp. L. 45 (2005).  The SEC agrees.  See Purchases 
of Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others, 47 Fed. Reg. 5333, 5334 n.5 
(Nov. 26, 1982); id., 68 Fed. Reg. 64952, 64953 n.5 (Nov. 17, 2003),  On the 
policy importance of this, see Jesse Fried, Insider Trading via the Corporation, 
162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 801 (2014). 
100  I and other academics have posed some version of this question for some 
time.  See Donald C. Langevoort, Investment Analysts and the Law of Insider 
Trading, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1023 (1990); see also Langevoort, INSIDER TRADING, 
supra, sec. 4:7 at 4-22 to -24.  More recently, with reference to Newman and 
Martoma, see Fox et al., supra; Guttentag, supra.   




has been otherwise for long enough to make it seem taken for 
granted.  There are also functional ones, as offered by Fox et al. or 
the concern—much more evident today than when Dirks was 
decided—that analysts and traders have conflicts of interest than 
can distort efficiency when trying to curry favor with issuers; 
conversely, executives of the issuer are tempted to use tips as a 
currency, favoring those who recommend the company’s stock (or 
might be willing to do so) but freezing out the nay-sayers.101  And 
then there is Regulation FD, which is a distinct duty of public 
disclosure imposed on issuers when choosing to convey 
nonpublic information to market professionals or professional 
traders.   As Donna Nagy has pointed out, an issuer-authorized tip 
is almost always an FD violation, from which it follows that any 
authorized agent of the issuer  is choosing to violate the law when 
engaged in selective disclosure—something readily seen as a 
breach of good faith and loyalty.  FD has vocal critics102 but is the 
law, which severely undermines the point of view that Dirks 
wants to protect and encourage informal disclosure.  But here, 
too, there may well be enough water over the dam that selective 
disclosure intended for company benefit will not seriously be 
questioned by the courts.  The insider trading canon may be 
closing. 
 




101  Powell’s view of the entirely healthy activities of analysts ignored the role 
of conflicts of interest; the crackdown on analysts who “sold” positive spins 
on their recommendations for either access or banking business suggests a 
more measured endorsement.     
102  For a balanced discussion of costs and benefits, see Jill Fisch, Regulation 
FD: An Alternative Approach to Addressing Informational Asymmetry, in 
Bainbridge, RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra. 




 All the debate over gratuitous tips was really just a preface 
to the bigger question of what a tippee has to know about the 
tipper and the tip in order to face liability.  This is Newman’s 
surviving contribution: the tippee has to know of the tipper’s 
breach of duty, including the personal benefit.103  Martoma 
acknowledges that this contribution stands unchallenged, at least 
in criminal cases, notwithstanding the trashing of the gift 
holding.104   
 That can be a tough standard for enforcers to meet when 
there is a chain of tippees who have not directly observed how the 
conveyance of inside information happened.  Dirks seems to speak 
to this clearly, but in a way that seems to contradict Newman: 
liability follows when the tippee “knows or should know” of the 
tipper’s breach.105  That language flummoxed the courts shortly 
after the Court’s ruling, and still does.106  The main question was 
how this interacts with the scienter requirement under Rule 10b-
5 (the product of an earlier Powell opinion for the Court in the 
Hochfelder case107).  “Should know” suggests a negligence 
standard, whereas Hochfelder rules that out.  Courts in the Second 
Circuit and elsewhere never quite sorted this through.  Many took 
the pragmatic step of substituting a recklessness standard, or 
conscious disregard.108   
This particular muddle, along with others we have seen, led 
to Obus. Somewhat heroically, Obus tore notice and scienter 
asunder, holding that the former addresses the duty issue alone—
when is it fair to treat the tippee as participant in a co-venture 
that somehow fiduciarizes him?  A liberal notice approach suffices 
 
103 773 F.3d at 449. 
104  Of course a more expansive approach to gift tips makes it somewhat 
easier to argue that the defendant knew that the tip was meant as a gift. 
105  646 U.S. at 660. 
106  See LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING, supra, sec. 4:10 at 4-36 to -40.   
107 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
108  See SEC v. Musella, 748 F. Supp.1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 




for that, said the court.  Separately, enforcers must show scienter, 
but that only goes to whether the tippee or traded “while in 
knowing possession” of such information.  Neither notice nor 
awareness was required of the benefit sought by the insider-
tipper.  This was not what Southern District judges, for the most 
part, thought the law was, and Judge Rakoff was particularly taken 
aback.109  A split within the district ensued, which brought us 
Newman.  
 Going back to Dirks’ original intent, Obus is right about one 
thing.  Justice Powell did not see his test (which for him was all 
about the tipper’s disloyal purpose) as addressing the scienter 
requirement.110  His notes show that he was troubled by this state 
of mind duality, but in early drafts the tension was minimal: the 
tippee had to know of the breach (and presumably the benefit).  
But without much explanation, the crucial words “or should 
know” were later inserted.  (Powell’s clerk at the time, now a 
federal judge, recalls vaguely that this was just an effort to 
conform to language in pre-Chiarella precedent.111) But the 
purported separation of duty and scienter is grossly unsatisfying; 
as courts quickly realized, scienter logically extends to all facts 
relevant to culpability.  Awareness of the breach, in other words, 
should be crucial to determining tippee guilt.  
  Newman makes tippee knowledge of the breach and the 
benefit essential, which does quite a beat-down on Obus.  With a 
wink to Judge Rakoff about Delphic opinions, Newman largely 
 
109  United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp.2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).   
110  See Pritchard, supra, at 867-68. 
111  Id. at 864-65 & n. 43.  This makes some sense in that the more expansive 
formulation could be found in two authorities cited at around this point in 
the opinion, Professor Louis Loss, and former SEC Commissioner Richard 
Smith, whose concurring opinion in an SEC administrative proceeding in 
many ways gave Powell a roadmap for (and was repeatedly cited in) 
Chiarella and Dirks.  See In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 650 
(1971).  On the context in which both Smith and Loss were working with 
respect to insider trading, see Langevoort, Two Duties, supra. 




ignores both Obus and the “should know” language in Dirks.112  
There is a fairly clear way of explaining the result and minimizing 
the damage to Obus, which I have always assumed to be the case.  
Newman strongly suggests that Judge Parker was addressing the 
criminal standard for liability,113 which (in addition to demanding 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the 10b-5 violation) insists on 
a showing of willfulness.  If the decision had been based on what 
willful should mean in prosecutions of remote tippees, the 
analysis would have some appeal.   But it doesn’t say that 
explicitly (though he mentions willfulness briefly), leading to still 
unresolved uncertainty (noted even in Judge Pooler’s dissent in 
Martoma I114) about the applicability of the strict Newman test in 
civil cases.  Rakoff took note of this shortly after Newman, 
suggesting that appellate judges pay more attention to willfulness 
and be clearer about the civil-criminal divide, and concluding that 
allegations of recklessness or conscious avoidance suffice with 
respect to the tippee’s awareness of the personal benefit in SEC 
cases.115 
 But perhaps something more subtle is also going on.  Judge 
Rakoff points out that when insider trading cases are brought 
 
112  Newman quotes the language from Dirks but never comes back to address 
it. 
113  For an out-of-circuit decision concluding that this is the proper 
interpretation, see United States v. Parigian, 824 F.3d 5, 10-11 (1st Cir. 2016).  
Salman takes as a given the government’s acknowledgement that Newman’s 
knowledge test applied in that case, which was criminal. See generally 
Strader, (Re)conceptualizing Insider Trading: United States v. Newman and 
the Intent to Defraud, 80 Brook. L. Rev. 1419 (2015). 
114  839 F.3d at 77 n .9  
115  SEC v. Payton, 97 F. Supp.3d 558, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).  A finding of 
liability in Payton was subsequently affirmed, 726 Fed. Appx. 832 (2d Cir. 
2018).  At roughly the same time as Judge Rakoff, another judge in the 
Southern District moved in the same direction by suggesting that the 
standard for tippee liability in civil cases should still be drawn from Obus. See 
SEC v. Jafar, 2015 WL 3604228 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).  Conscious avoidance 
generally suffices in criminal as well as civil cases.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Goffer, 721 F.3d 113, 127-29 (2d Cir. 2013). 




criminally, courts may feel “obliged to define unlawful insider 
trading narrowly, so as to provide the fair notice that due process 
requires before a person may be placed in jeopardy of 
imprisonment. Other times those cases are civil proceedings, most 
often brought by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, in 
which circumstance a court is inclined to define unlawful insider 
trading broadly, so as to effectuate the remedial purposes behind 
the prohibition of such trading.”116  To think of insider trading as 
embezzlement, or tippee liability as a straightforward stolen 
goods problem, is to frame insider trading as naturally and 
ordinarily criminal.  But that is a late arriving point of view. For 
most of the first two decades of federal insider trading 
enforcement, insider trading law was entirely generated by SEC 
administrative proceedings and enforcement action.117  Given the 
entirely equitable nature of the remedies available to the SEC back 
then (disgorgement and/or an injunction),118 it was not surprising 
that the law could be applied so flexibly.  Private rights of action 
seeking damages for insider trading (part of the Texas Gulf 
Sulphur story) became of serious concern, but soon enough was 
calmed via a distinctly restitutionary approach to measuring 
damages.119 Criminal insider trading cases did not happen at all 
until Chiarella’s time; the Boesky-era spate of high visibility 
prosecutions didn’t come until later in the 1980s.120   
 I do worry that as we think and talk about insider trading 
more through the lens of criminality, courts have come to fashion 
 
116  97 F. Supp.3d at 559. 
117  See Langevoort, Two Duties, supra. 
118  Until 1984, the SEC’s remedy in an insider trading matters was 
disgorgement of profits and, possibly, an injunction against future 
violations—both purely equitable remedies.  See LANGEVOORT, INSIDER 
TRADING, supra, sec. 8:1 at 8-2 to -3 
119  This was first by judicial ruling, Elkind v. Liggett & Myers Inc., 635 F.2d 
156 (2d Cir. 1980), and then incorporated into Section 20A(b)(1) of the 
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984. 
120 LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING, at 1-3 to -4; see generally JAMES STEWART, DEN 
OF THIEVES (1991). 




the law accordingly. By the criminalization of doctrine, I mean 
doctrinal choices made by the courts either to reflect its peculiarly 
criminal nature or attend to concerns about lenity, notice and due 
process under the threat of incarceration.121  My concern is that 
insider trading law may suffer when tweaks in doctrine occur that 
have prosecution in mind but then also burden the SEC in civil 
cases because they affect the meaning of the rule.  This is part of 
what Rakoff was saying. 
 Consider the facts of Newman in a civil enforcement context.  
The defendants were third and fourth level tippees of earnings-
related information from Dell and Nvidia, which came from mid-
level insiders at the issuers.  The “gift” part of the case arose 
because it was not obvious why they leaked the information; 
there were casual relationships between the insiders and the 
analyst/acquaintances who were the first-level tippees, not 
known on down the chain of other tippees.  However, the leaks 
were high quality and repeated, suggesting deliberateness from 
within the companies.  The court (and notable commentators122) 
stressed that these leaks might well have been designed to serve 
the issuer’s interests, but if these particular tippers were acting 
with authorization, we would seem to have a gross violation of the 
SEC’s Regulation FD.123  As quite a number of courts have said, it 
 
121 See Justice Scalia’s objections to the denial of certiorari in United States v. 
Whitman, 135 S.Ct. 352 (2014). 
122  See Macey, supra.   
123   As noted, Regulation FD is an SEC disclosure rule requiring that if 
material non-public information is to be given to analysts or active 
shareholders, it must simultaneously be disclosed to the public.  See 
LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING sec. 12:12.  By all accounts, it was adopted by the 
SEC because of concern that under Dirks, selective disclosure is hard to 
sanction.  The category of persons whose disclosure trigger the FD obligation 
include lower or mid-level personnel authorized by higher ups to convey 
such information; unauthorized personnel are presumed to be acting for 
personal benefit.  I agree with Donna Nagy, supra, that FD ought to play a role 
in fashioning insider trading rules, even though it explicitly is not an insider 




can be reckless to ignore the likelihood that multiple accurate tips 
were somehow the product of innocence.124  If brought by the SEC, 
I believe, such a case should go to a well-instructed jury for a 
determination of liability.  Nothing in Obus stands in the way, 
while the language in Newman encourages resistance. 
 There are other places where insider trading law has been 
narrowed seemingly out of fear of the consequences in criminal 
prosecutions. Another has to do with the meaning of “tip,” also 
addressed in Martoma.  It is not hard to find recent case law 
saying that there is only a tip if the tipper “expects” the tippee to 
trade; others have suggested different wording: “intending” there 
to be trading, or “with the understanding that” there will be 
trading,” for example.125  But in the civil context, Obus had clearly 
opened the possibility to reckless tips.126  This harkens back to 
cases like Libera, before it was clear that Dirks’ personal benefit 
standard even applied to misappropriation claims.  Recall that it 
was not clear that the insiders knew what the recipients intended 
to do with the leaked copies of Business Week.  The court affirmed 
the conviction, refusing to impose more exacting definition of tip.  
 
trading rule itself.  An intentional violation of Regulation FD is, under 
contemporary corporate law, a breach of loyalty. 
124  See note --- supra. 
125  See United States v. Stewart, 907 F.3d 677 (2d Cir. 2018)(“intended”); 
United States v. Gannsman, 657 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 2011)(“expects”).  In the 
arguments in the Salman case in the Supreme Court, the government 
acknowledged an “expectation” test to what constitutes a tip in order to 
reduce concerns about its broad approach to personal benefit.  Again, the 
position is set forth in the Salman opinion, without necessarily any 
endorsement or criticism.  137 S.Ct. at 427.  This is relevant to the curious 
conundrum about whether 10b-5 applies to a “tip” where the tipper’s 
purpose is to freeze the recipient from trading for fear of liability once 
material nonpublic information has been imparted.  See Andrew Verstein, 
Informational Tainting: Strategic Tipping of Material Nonpublic Information, 
112 Nw. U. L. Rev. 725 (2018). 
126 693 F.3d at 287, offering a hypothetical of an insider on a commuter train 
talking about work on his cell phone while aware that potential traders are in 
earshot.  I have wondered about how this squares with the personal benefit 
requirement. See Langevoort, Fine Distinctions, supra, at 446-51.   




The circumstances made clear that it was “not for nothing” that 
the misappropriation was occurring, and that was enough to hold 
the tippees liable.  That makes a great deal of common sense, but 
might not pass today’s stricter test as the intentionality locution 
becomes the common reading. 
A third example goes back a bit further, to the debate over 
whether liability for insider trading requires proof that the trader 
bought or sold because of the inside information, or merely that 
he or she possessed it at the time of the trading (possession 
versus use).  The Second Circuit settled on and has stuck to a 
possession test,127 which is more enforcer friendly.  By contrast, 
the Ninth Circuit insisted on use in a criminal case,128 and the 
Eleventh Circuit followed its lead even in an SEC enforcement 
action,129 albeit with a rebuttable presumption of use upon a 
showing of possession.  The SEC tried to resolve this conflict by 
rule-making, saying in Rule 10b5-1, which somewhat oddly says 
that unlawful must be “on the basis of” the inside information 
(suggesting the possibility of a use standard) but then defining 
that phrase to be satisfied upon a showing that the person in 
question “was aware of” the information at the time of trading.  
Even this, however, has not put an end to the disagreement in the 
circuits, with many courts outside the Second Circuit holding to a 
use standard at least in criminal cases, and perhaps civil as 
well.130 Some simply ignore 10b5-1; others express doubt about 
the Commission’s power to take this doctrinal issue away from 
them.131   
My point here is not to criticize these moves, but rather to 
urge caution.  At heart, insider trading liability is an equitable 
 
127  See Steginsky v. Xcelera Inc., 741 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 2014); United States v. 
Teicher, 987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1993). 
128  United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998). 
129  SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998).   
130  See LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING sec. 3:14, at 3-43 (collecting cases). 
131  E.g., United States v. Nacchio, 519 F.3d 1140, 1168-70 (8th Cir. 2008). 




doctrine, with a duty to disclose imposed on fiduciaries and their 
confederates as a market cleansing device, a signal of commitment 
to the idea that while the playing field will never be even, 
disparities shouldn’t be exploited by those who are supposed to 
be acting for the benefit of others in handling sensitive secrets.  
This requires some balance and restraint, as Merritt Fox and his 
co-authors stress.132  Insider trading threatens liquidity, as a 
matter of adverse selection; at the same time, we don’t want to 
interfere with legitimate efforts to make prices more efficient.  
They think insider trading law as currently formulated does 
reasonably well at this balance under both the classical and 
misappropriation theories, and civil remedies give the SEC and 
the courts great discretion in matching the remedy to the conduct. 
My fear is that thinking about insider trading mainly as a 
crime pulverizes these nuances.  On one hand, it leads to an 
inflation of the perceived harm from insider trading and tipping, 
causing enforcers and judges to get on a rhetorical high horse to 
justify the painful criminal sanctions that we now expect upon 
conviction.  None of this is to advocate for a robust permission to 
engage in insider trading a la Henry Manne and the (relatively 
few) of his evangelists who remain133—cumulatively, the threats 
to good disclosure practices, corporate confidentiality and market 
liquidity mount up to good cause for regulation and enforcement.  
I don’t even object to the dramaturgical nature of the campaign, 
given the branding effect mentioned earlier.  But in making 
doctrine, judges and enforcers shouldn’t lose sight of what really 
is at stake, and, as Rakoff says, choose their words carefully.  
 
V. NEVER MIND: THE BLASZCZAK DETOUR 
 
132  See Fox et al., supra. 
133  E.g., Mercer Bullard, Insider Trading in a Mannean Marketplace, 88 
Temple L. Rev. 223 (2016). 





 With this we come to the Second Circuit’s most recent 
judicial revisionism of insider trading law, United States v. 
Blaszczak.134  In it, we receive the news that the Dirks personal 
benefit test only applies to claims securities fraud within the 
confines of Rule 10b-5 (or more precisely, the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934), not to mail or wire fraud prosecutions or the “new” 
criminal securities fraud statute (18 USC section 1348) enacted as 
part of Sarbanes-Oxley’s response to the financial reporting 
scandals almost twenty years ago.  In other words, forget all the 
foregoing discussion of personal benefit when prosecutors choose 
to attack insider trading under one of those alternative criminal 
statutes.   
 By now, it should be clear that I do not think that Dirks 
personal benefit test accomplishes much, and so I am not by any 
means displeased with the result in Blaszczak.  On the other hand, 
the result invites bringing challenging tipper-tippee cases 
(especially chain-link ones) as criminal rather than civil cases, 
contrary to how insider trading enforcement is meant to work—
the point made in the previous section.   
 Judge Sullivan’s opinion is an embrace of embezzlement as 
the touchstone for these Title 18 statutes, which does connect it to 
all the foregoing in this essay. He is channeling (with attribution 
via multiple citations) what both Judges Winter135 and Rakoff136 
have said: that when we think of insider trading as 
misappropriation akin to embezzlement, a stolen goods approach 
 
134 --- F.3d --- (2d Cir. 2019). 
135  In his concurring opinion in Chestman, 947 F.2d at 581, Judge Winter 
explicitly addressed the relationship between Rule 10b-5 and mail fraud 
doctrine as to personal benefit, acknowledging that it was a hard question he 
was not ready to answer.   
136 Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F. Supp.3d at 298; see also Rakoff’s opinion in United 
States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp.2d at --.   




to the liability of those who receive tips makes sense without any 
personal benefit gloss.  As we have seen, until Obus, that was 
arguably the 10b-5 law in the Second Circuit, and so—albeit only 
in the criminal context—Blaszczak may just be correcting the 
wobble from Obus’ earlier apparent mischaracterization of Libera 
and Falcone.137  This makes it at least a partial stealth overruling, 
without even touching Rule 10b-5.138 
 Blaszczak treats wire fraud and the SOX crime as essentially 
the same for this purpose, but they really are two distinct statutes.  
The law of mail and wire fraud is massive, even as to the specific 
issue of misappropriation of intangible property, and certainly as 
to the “honest services” jurisprudence that went into its own 
wobble and hasn’t ever, so far as I can tell, found stability.139  In its 
decision in Carpenter,140 the Supreme Court explicitly accepted 
the possibility that mail and wire fraud can reach insider trading 
even when Rule 10b-5 doesn’t;141 starting immediately in the 
aftermath of its decision (which made many securities law types 
uncomfortable142), commentators and judges asked whether 
 
137  See text accompanying notes --- supra.   
138  Judge Sullivan wrote the district court opinion in the Newman case that 
took Obus about awareness of personal benefit at its word, and was then 
famously reversed. 
139  Illustrated most notably the Supreme Court decision in United States v. 
Skilling, 130 S.Ct. 2836 (2010).  See Note, Reframing the Right: Using Theories 
of Intangible Property to Target Honest Services Fraud after Skilling, 112 
Colum. L. Rev. 359 (2012). 
140  Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 350 (1987).   
141   See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 678 n. 25.  The Court indicated that it was not its 
job to decide whether this kind of result was good enforcement policy.  In 
Blaszczak, puzzlingly also sought to bolster the case for allowing mail fraud 
to have a broader reach than Rule 10b-5 by reference to Justice Thomas’s 
dissenting opinion in O’Hagan, and United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 953 
(4th Cir. 1995), both of which were efforts to strike down the 
misappropriation theory under Rule 10b-5—which the majority of the Court 
rejected. 
142  See John C. Coffee Jr., Hush! The Criminal Status of Confidential 
Information after McNally and Carpenter, and the Enduring Problem of 
Overcriminalization, 26 Am. Crim. L. Rev.121 (1988). 




Dirks’ personal benefit test should have any continuing place with 
respect to crimes akin to embezzlement.143  Whatever the 
preferred answer, the issue was always in plain sight but of little 
import so long as personal benefit was easily found, which only 
changed after Newman.  Judge Rakoff has long been a mail/wire 
fraud exceptionalist (he once called mail fraud the prosecutors’ 
“Stradivarius”144), wanting to treat securities fraud as a mere 
“specialized subspecies” of the more fundamental mail and wire 
fraud prohibition.145 
Section 1348, on the other hand, is meant for the world of 
public company securities fraud, though characterized by 
immense confusion about why it was needed, what it does 
differently from Section 32(a) of the ’34 Act, etc. whether as to 
insider trading or more generally.146  There are some obvious 
possibilities, but none make it easy to walk the line between 
undue vagueness on one hand and duplication of Section 32(a) on 
the other.147  Judge Sullivan takes some liberties here when he 
 
143  See, e.g., Michael Dreeben, Insider Trading and Intangible Rights: The 
Redefinition of the Mail Fraud Statute, 26 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 181, 214 (1988).  
More recently, Bill Wang gave this issue substantial coverage in his article 
Application of Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes to Criminal Liability for Stock 
Market Insider Trading and Tipping, 70 U. Miami L. Rev. 220 (2015). 
144  Rakoff, supra, at 771. 
145  United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp.2d 363, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d 
555 Fed. Appx. 98 (2d Cir. 2014). 
146  A principal proponent in Congress was Senator Patrick Leahy, who 
indicated the need to create a mechanism for prosecution not bounded by 
technical limitations.  That is odd, because that is precisely why Section 10(b) 
was created.  See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 385 (1990).  Perhaps Leahy would 
point to the decision by Enron prosecutors to charge a margin violation to 
avoid a more complicated route to convictions.  See William Widen, Enron at 
the Margin, 58 Bus. Law. 961 (2003). 
147  On the possibilities, see Woody, supra; Couture, supra (suggesting a 
lower threshold of materiality); Langevoort, INSIDER TRADING, sec. 8:13.  The 
most noteworthy decision of relevance to insider trading until Blaszczak was 
United States v. Mahaffy, 693 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2012), which tracked the 




says that “as Dirks explained, in order to protect the free flow of 
information into the securities markets, Congress enacted the 
Title 15 fraud provision with the limited ‘purpose of . . . 
[e]liminating [the] use of inside information for personal 
advantage.’”  Actually, that sentence in Dirks (ignoring all the 
brackets and ellipses) says that removing personal advantage was 
just a purpose, among many.148 
 My unease with Blaszczak simply takes us back to what we 
said earlier about the embezzlement/stolen goods label.  
Information use and dissemination from inside public companies 
is immensely weighty as a matter of policy, much more than the 
simplistic invocation of embezzlement can bear.  “Akin to” is not 
the same as “is.”  Reference to breach of fiduciary duty is required 
in ordinary classical and misappropriation enforcement 
proceedings in order to address the “fine distinctions” between 
good and bad ways of obtaining or using material nonpublic 
information.  Existing doctrine could surely do better, but it would 
require something more than reference to stolen goods.  Imagine 
if Raymond Dirks was prosecuted for mail fraud.  My sense is that 
Equity Funding’s property right in the exclusive use of its inside 
information (or Dirks’ awareness of Secrest’s interference) would 
not play much of a role in its outcome.  It’s in Title 15 that we see 
so much more to the conundrum, which shouldn’t be shoved aside 
simply by invoking Title 18. 
 Newman provides another good example.  We have already 
seen that its outcome could have been different if brought as a 
civil enforcement action by the SEC.  There was surely ambiguity 
about how and why the information leaked from the two 
companies and made its way into the hands of the portfolio 
managers three or four times removed.  Dirks’ “should know” 
 
misappropriation theory in a front-running case involving broker-dealer 
dissemination of “squawk box” information to favored clients.   
148  Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662. 




phrase helps to make sense of competing narratives as to the 
insiders’ motives.  Note that back in the days when tipper-tippee 
law drew a distinction between classical and misappropriation 
cases, cases like Libera and Falcone still applied everything about 
the Dirks test except personal benefit.  If we do indeed move to a 
world where Title 18 crimes are charged more frequently to avoid 
Dirks, there will  be much more work for the courts to do in 
fashioning good policy and doctrine, and getting the enforcement 
incentives right. Again, I’m happy to see personal benefit go, 
whatever the enforcement vehicle.  But Title 15 “theory” deserves 
its say in puzzling through what should take its place in hard 
cases. 
  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
 “But the uneasiness of sending a good person to jail for a long time 
based on a very abstract definition of harm was tough to swallow, 
because Rakoff understood the intellectual disconnects very well.  
There was a special irony in invoking [the misappropriation] 
doctrine designed to promote [a more] even playing field for public 
investors in a case where the role of poor victim was played by 
Goldman Sachs.”149 
  
 All the previous quotes have been Rakoff’s.  This last one is 
mine, which I wrote a few years ago about the difficulties Judge 
Rakoff faced and to an extent expressed in sentencing Rajat Gupta 
to two years in prison in one of the biggest insider trading cases of 
the time.  Rakoff was trying to make sense of how and why a 
seemingly good man like Gupta acted as he did, and the right 
penalty for a crime that might well have caused no direct 
pecuniary harm at all to its victim, notwithstanding what the 
 
149  DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK: CORPORATIONS, WALL 
STREET AND THE DILEMMAS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 63 (2016). 




Sentencing Guidelines were saying about a longer period of 
incarceration.  My impression was that Rakoff understood very 
well the uneasy nature of insider trading law and enforcement, 
more than he could say out loud in sentencing Gupta 
The best animating rhetoric for insider trading regulation 
today can be found in Rakoff’s own words: the promise to fight 
against a playing field that is tilted in favor of cheaters, i.e., those 
who would wrongfully exploit their access to secrets.150 His 
insider trading jurisprudence (holdings, dicta and asides) harkens 
back to Chief Justice Burger in Chiarella, who had the good idea of 
building a more expansive source of wrongful access or use while 
avoiding the unrealism of equal access.151  Going back a number of 
years now, Rakoff has been calling for Congress to replant the 
garden maze of doctrine that has too many circles and dead ends 
by writing a clear statutory definition of insider trading.152 Putting 
aside his claim that insider trading is a straightforward concept 
(with which I disagree), he is surely right about the unnecessary 
complications some courts have caused. Surely there is a better 
way going forward. 
 
150  SEC v. Payton, 97 F. Supp.3d 558, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)(Rakoff, J.: “The 
Unites States securities markets—the comparative honesty of which is one of 
our nation's great business assets—cannot tolerate such cheating if those 
markets are to retain the confidence of investors and the public alike”). 
151  See Donald C. Langevoort, Words from on High about Rule 10b-5: 
Chiarella’s History, Central Bank’s Future, 20 Del. J. Corp. L. 866, 883-84 
(1995).  Donna Nagy has long championed Burger’s view of misappropriation 
as well.  See sources cited in notes – supra.  I read Burger as grounding the 
case against Chiarella in terms of embezzlement or theft, but not confining 
the 10b-5 duty to violations of positive criminal law. His approach 
presumably takes in all wrongful ways of obtaining or using inside 
information. 
152  United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp.2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); SEC v. 
Payton, 97 F. Supp.3d 558, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). Many others agree.  E.g., 
Roberta D. Karmel, The Fiduciary Principle of Insider Trading Needs Revision, 
56 Wash. U.J.L. & Pol’y 121 (2018). Rakoff is currently taking part in the 
revisionist effort. See Insider Trading Isn’t So Simple, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-10-15/insider-trading-
isn-t-so-simple.    
